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POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER:
ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES

I. DESCRIPTION
OF ALTERNATIVE
BOUNDARIES*

The following ten lines, which cover most of the possible compromises between the frontier of 1938 and the Soviet-German partition line of September 28, 1939, will be discussed in terms of 1) their strategic implications for the two states and for general security in Europe; 2) the way in which they divide the various ethnic groups inhabiting the disputed area; 3) their probable economic advantages and disadvantages to the two states; 4) their bearing upon communications and transportation.

A. The Soviet-German
Partition Line of 1939

This line followed the former Polish-Lithuanian boundary southwestward from the frontier of Latvia to the southernmost tip of Lithuania, then cut across the base of the Suwalki salient (leaving the powiat of Suwalki and part of that of Augustów to Germany) then followed the boundary between Poland and East Prussia and the Pisa and the Narew Rivers to the city of Ostroleka, then ran in a southwesterly direction to meet the Bug River near the town of Malkinia; it followed the Bug upstream as far as the town of Krystynopol, in Eastern Galicia, turned west and ran in a nearly straight line to a point on the San River near Sieniawa, then followed the San River upstream to the old border between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In the consideration of this line as a possible Polish-Soviet boundary the point where the Pisa River crosses the boundary of East Prussia will be taken as the northern terminus; the Suwalki district thus falls on the Soviet side of the line.

B. The

* See Map 13, Polish Series (Eastern Poland: Distribution of Population).

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B. The Curzon Line
of 1919 and its
Continuation Through
Eastern Galicia

On December 8, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers recognized the right of Poland "to proceed with the organization of a regular administration" in the territory west of a line which followed the Bug downstream from the northern border of Eastern Galicia to the administrative boundary between the districts of ~~Nielsk~~ and Brest-Litovsk, then ran in a general northeasterly direction to pass east of the town of Hainowka and reach the Lososna River near its source; it followed the Lososna River, with some deviations, to its confluence with the Niemen River, then followed the latter past Grodno to the district of Suwalki, the eastern and northern boundary of which it followed, with slight deviations, to the border of East Prussia.

The line which the Supreme Council accepted, in 1919, as the western boundary of Eastern Galicia, for which a special status was under consideration, was a continuation of the Curzon Line. It followed the southern boundary of the province of Lublin as far as Belzec, then turned south to follow the western boundaries of the districts of Rawa Ruska, Jaworów, Mosciska, Sambor, Stary Sambor and Turka.

C. Line "C"

This line follows the eastern boundary of the province (województwo) of Bialystok from the former Polish-Lithuanian border to the Bug River, and the Soviet-German partition line of 1939 thereafter.

D. Line "D"

This line is identical with line "C" as far as the northern boundary of Eastern Galicia; from that point it continues along the Bug River upstream to the city of Kamionka Strumilowa, whence it runs due south and follows the eastern boundary of the province of Lwów to the point

where

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where it meets the Bóbrka-Przemyślany road; it then turns west to run south of the city of Bóbrka to the point common to the three districts (powiaty) of Lwów, Bóbrka and Zydzaczów, and follows, with slight deviations, the eastern boundary of the province of Lwów to the former Polish-Czechoslovak frontier. This line follows an alternative western boundary of Eastern Galicia proposed by the British Delegation to the Peace Conference in 1919.

E. Line "E"

This line follows the eastern boundaries of the following districts leaving them all within Poland: Święciany, Wilno-Troki, Oszmiana, Lida, Szczuczyn, Wolkowysk, Bielsk; it then follows the Soviet-German partition line of 1939 from Niemirów (the point where the administrative boundary between the districts of Bielsk and Brześć-nad-Bugiem meets the Bug River) to the former frontier between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

F. Line "F"

This line is identical with Line "E" as far as the point common to the three districts of Bielsk, Brześć-nad-Bugiem and Prużana; it then follows the eastern boundaries of the following districts, leaving them all within Poland: Brześć-nad-Bugiem, Luboml, Włodzimierz, Sokal, Zolkiew, Lwów, Bóbrka, Zydzaczów and Kalusz.

G. Line "G"

This line follows the eastern boundaries of the provinces of Białystok and Lublin, then the southern boundary of Wołyń and the eastern boundary of Tarnopol thus leaving to the Soviet Union the four eastern provinces of Wilno, Nowogródek, Polesie and Wołyń.

H. Line "H"

This line is identical with Line "G", except for the attribution to Poland of the three districts of Brześć-nad-Bugiem, Luboml and Włodzimierz.

I. Line

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I. Line "I"

This line is identical with Line "F" from the border of Lithuania to the border of Eastern Galicia, whose northern and eastern boundary it follows to the point common to the pre-1939 frontiers of Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union.

J. Line "J"

This line is identical with Line "B" (Curzon Line) as far as the northern border of Eastern Galicia, then continuing along the Bug River upstream to the city of Kamionka Strumilowa, and running south along the boundary between the provinces of Tarnopol and Lwów, then along the boundary between Tarnopol and Stanislawów, to terminate at the former Polish-Rumanian frontier near Zaleszizyki.

II. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. Soviet Strategic Aims

The territory between Line "A" and the former Polish-Soviet frontier provided a cushion for absorbing the German attack in 1941; the time which the Soviet armies won by fighting delaying actions in former Polish territory may have been a crucial factor in saving Moscow and Leningrad from capture in 1941. On the other hand, it is sometimes maintained that the severe losses suffered by the Red Army in battles of encirclement west of the main line of fortifications along the old Soviet-Polish frontier were too high a price to pay for the time gained. Whatever the military value of this territory to the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet Government will probably see strategic advantages in recovering it. Following rivers for most of its length and anchored on the Carpathian Mountains at its southern end, the line of 1939 (Line "A") could be fortified and made more defensible than the frontier of 1920-1939. From the Soviet viewpoint, all the alternative boundaries to the east of this line would be less satisfactory, since they reduce the width of the protective area which could be used for defensive fighting.

Should

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Should the Soviet Union desire to play an active role in Central Europe, it would prefer Line "A" to the other suggested boundaries. Central and Western European nations may look with some apprehension on the extension of Soviet so far to the west.

2. Polish Strategic Aims

Poland will be in a difficult military position, no matter where the boundary is drawn, and will have to depend for security upon allies among the Great Powers or upon a collective security system. Insofar as Poland's strategic interests are served by keeping the eastern boundary as far as possible from Warsaw and the heart of Poland, Line "A" is the least favorable, and the former Polish-Soviet boundary the most favorable.

3. The Northern Sector

The strategic problems in the northern sector are connected with the questions of the future disposition of Lithuania. If Lithuania again becomes a Soviet Republic, the Wilno region would probably go to the Soviet Union; otherwise it would be a thin and highly exposed Polish salient projecting into Soviet territory. Lines "E", "F" and "I" would thus be eliminated from consideration.

Line "A", which at one point runs within one hundred kilometers of Warsaw, would put Poland in a difficult strategic position. The "Curzon" line (Lines "B" and "J") would be less objectionable to the Poles on this score, and those which follow the eastern border of the province of Bialystok (Lines "C", "D", "G" and "H") are even better.

If Lithuania becomes independent and enters into close association with Poland, lines "E", "F" and "I", which leave the city of Wilno and five additional districts to Poland, would give Poland a larger bloc of territory in the north but no special strategic advantages.

Wilno,

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Wilno, though an important point in any Polish-Lithuanian plan of defense, would be in a very vulnerable location.

4. The Central Sector

There are only two alternative boundaries in the central sector, where seven of the lines ("A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "G", "J") follow the course of the Bug River, and the other three ("F", "H", "I") follow a line parallel to the Bug about forty kilometers to the east. The Bug makes a fairly good geographic boundary, although it is not a formidable barrier to military operations. The Poles consider the line of the Bug to be uncomfortably close to central Poland. They would probably feel a greater sense of security if they held Brest-Litovsk, on the eastern bank, and an additional forty-kilometer-wide strip of territory. The Pripet marshes would not serve Poland as a defensive barrier if the Soviet Union held Brest-Litovsk, which lies immediately to the west of the marsh area and is connected by double-tracked strategic railways with Minsk and Kiev.

5. The Southern Sector

The strategic significance of the alternative boundaries in Eastern Galicia lies in their location with respect to the Carpathian Mountains. Those lines which terminate at the former Polish-Czechoslovak border near the source of the San River (lines "A", "B", "C", "E") bring the Soviet Union to the crest of the Carpathians along the whole northern border of Ruthenia. The most easily traversible passes through the northern Carpathians lie along this border. Three minor railways running through these passes connect the former Polish and Czechoslovak railway systems.

Possession of this Carpathian frontier would probably assure the Soviet Union of a large voice in the affairs of Central Europe. Bordering on the disputed territory of Ruthenia, which is inhabited by a Ukrainian-

speaking

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-speaking population, it could make its influence felt in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary. Poland and Rumania would be deprived of the common frontier they possessed between 1920 and 1939. The strategic position of the Soviet Union in the face of a potentially hostile Polish-Rumanian bloc or larger East European grouping would be very strong. The possibility that any of the nations of Eastern Europe, singly or in combination, could defend themselves against the Soviet Union, would be small.

Lines "D" and "F" partition Eastern Galicia from north to south; they are slightly more favorable to Poland than the San River line. The Soviet Union would still have a Carpathian frontier, but it would be shorter, and the wedge of Soviet territory between Poland and Rumania would be narrower. Under Line "D" the Soviet Union would have access to two Carpathian passes; under line "F" to but one, the Jablonica Pass.

Lines "G", "H" and "I" leave the whole of Eastern Galicia to Poland. The Soviet frontier would be about one hundred miles distant from the Carpathians, as before 1939. If Rumania should retain Bukovina, Poland and Rumania would have a common frontier, and the Soviet pressure upon Central Europe would be somewhat less than if Soviet territory extended to the Carpathians. Poland and Rumania would be directly connected by the strategic Lwów-Cernăuți railway.

Line "J" is a compromise line running through Eastern Galicia roughly along the administrative boundary between the provinces of Lwów and Stanisławów, on the one hand, and Tarnopol on the other. This line leaves to Poland the crest of the Carpathians all the way to the border of Bukovina. Again, in the supposition of Rumania's retaining Bukovina it would give Poland and Rumania a common frontier and a belt of territory about one hundred kilometers in width east of the Carpathians. The Lwów-Cernăuți railway, which would run within Polish territory at a distance of a few miles from the frontier, would probably be of little use to Poland in a defensive military campaign against the Soviet Union.

III. ETHNIC

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III. ETHNIC FACTORS

1. Ethnic Groups in Eastern Poland 1/

The territory lying east of the Soviet-German line of September 28, 1939, (including the district of Suwalki, which was then annexed to East Prussia) had about twelve million inhabitants in 1931, according to the Polish census of that year. Forty percent were listed as Polish-speaking, 34 percent as Ukrainian-speaking, 8.2 as White Russian-speaking, and 1.1 percent as Russian-speaking. The Soviet Union could lay claim, on ethnic grounds, to 49 percent of the population of this area; this figure includes the White Russians, who are concentrated in the northern provinces, the Ukrainians, who inhabit the southern provinces, the Russians, who are scattered throughout the whole area, and the "local" inhabitants of the province of Polesie. The "local" languages of this last-named group are variations and dialects of White Russian and Ukrainian, which the census-takers chose not to classify with those two main language groups.

The Polish-speaking population in the area east of the line of 1939 (Line "A") numbered 4,833,918 in 1931 and over five millions in 1939, according to official Polish figures. The Poles are the majority nationality in the Bialystok, Wilno and Lwów areas, and they represent a substantial element in the population elsewhere. Although the upper and middle class Poles, who made up the greater part of the landlord and professional classes before 1939, will be greatly reduced in number at the close of the war, the Polish peasantry will probably remain as a numerically important minority in both the White Russian and Ukrainian-populated regions. 2/

2. Political

1/ See T Document 218, "Eastern Poland: Ethnic Composition of the Population".

2/ See Tables I and II for statistics on the ethnic groups on each side of the ten alternative boundaries.

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2. Political Aspirations of the Different Ethnic Groups

The language statistics, even if assumed to be one-hundred percent accurate, cannot be accepted as an infallible index of the aspirations of the various ethnic groups inhabiting Eastern Poland, particularly when they are limited to a choice between Polish and Soviet rule. It is probably safe to assume that the overwhelming majority of those whose mother-tongue is Polish would favor the restoration of Polish sovereignty. The aspirations of the non-Polish-speaking inhabitants are not so clear.

a. The White Russians.--The White Russian-speaking people of the northern provinces are a culturally backward peasant population, with no coherent political groupings or programs. They had both national and social grievances against the pre-1939 Polish regime; there was some sympathy with the Soviet Union and with Communism. Generally speaking, the White Russians seem to have welcomed the Soviet occupation in 1939, for it meant liberation from their Polish landlords and the distribution of land to the peasantry. Under Polish rule their living standards were so low that there could hardly be any strong objection, on economic grounds, to incorporation in the Soviet Union, despite the adjustments involved in the process of "Sovietization". In the cultural sphere the White Russians of former Poland would probably have greater opportunities for development in association with Soviet White Russia than as citizens of a reconstituted Poland.

b. The Ukrainians.--The case of the Ukrainians is somewhat different. They are more advanced, culturally and politically, than the White Russians. Especially in Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainians had developed both economic and political organizations intended to further the welfare and aspirations of the national community. The prevalence of individual peasant farms in this area has contributed to the growth of a strong feeling of Ukrainian nationalism directed against both Poland and the Soviet Union. Although the Ukrainians of Eastern Poland are divided by religion (some are Orthodox, some Uniate), by differing historical experience (some

under

-10-

under ^Austria, some under Russia), and by varying shades of political opinion, they have been more or less united in their opposition to the Polish state. Very few, in the 1918-1939 period, favored incorporation in the Soviet Ukraine. Given a choice, the majority would probably favor an independent Western Ukrainian Republic, which might include Carpathian Ruthenia and northern Bukovina as well as Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. This solution seems politically impossible now, as it was in 1919.

The year and a half of Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland was not a happy experience for many of the former leading elements among the Ukrainian and White Russian population. The nationalist political parties were liquidated. The intelligentsia and "kulak" elements, and even some Communists, were persecuted. The collectivization of agriculture, gradually introduced in 1940 and 1941, can hardly have been welcomed by the peasants. Generally speaking, however, the elimination of the Polish ruling class and the fact that a distribution of land to the peasants preceded collectivization (which could then be introduced slowly and without the use of force), compensated for the "invasion" of Communist Party men and G. P. U. agents, the absence of political freedom, and the campaign against religion. 3/

The Ukrainians of this area, for the most part, consider the choice between Polish and Soviet rule as a choice between two evils. Union with the Soviet Ukraine would seem to be a more natural association for them than a return to Polish rule, which has a long record of bitterness and failure.

3. Northern Sector

While in the central and southern sectors Line "A" roughly follows the line of ethnic division between the predominantly Polish area and the area of mixed population, in the north it runs far to the west of any plausible

ethnic

3/ See T Document 228, "Soviet Rule in Eastern Poland, 1939-1941"

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ethnic line. It leaves outside Poland all but a fraction of the province of Bialystok and also the Wilno region (the five districts of Święciany, Wilno-Troki, Oszmiana, Lida and Szczuczyn); in both these areas the Poles had a 70 percent majority in the census of 1931. This ethnically Polish territory, which contains one and one-half million of the nearly five million Poles living east of Line "A", is contiguous to the purely Polish territory west of Line "A".

The "Curzon" Line (Lines "B" and "J") more nearly approaches the line of division between strongly Polish and mixed territory, although in the absence of statistics on individual communes, it is impossible to tell how nearly they coincide. That part of the province of Bialystok which lies to the west of Lines "B" and "J" (including the Suwalki district) is overwhelmingly Polish. The only districts which have a substantial White Russian population are Grodno, Bielsk and Wolkowysk, which lie, wholly or in part, on the eastern or Soviet side.

Lines "C", "D", "G" and "H", following the eastern boundary of the province of Bialystok, are slightly more favorable to Poland. They leave to Poland an area with a large Polish majority and with a White Russian minority of about 200,000 living in the area adjacent to Soviet territory. A large Polish population, living in the provinces of Wilno and Nowogródek, would be left within the Soviet Union. The Poles in these two provinces outnumber the White Russians by a margin of nearly two to one (1,315,500 to 703,000) according to the Polish census statistics.

Lines "E", "F" and "I" leave to Poland five additional districts, including the strongly Polish city of Wilno. Although this region is not likely to fall to Poland unless Lithuania again becomes an independent state, Poland's claim to it on ethnic grounds is good. The census of 1931 listed 698,000 Poles, 78,000 White Russians, and 65,000 Lithuanians in these five districts. In the remaining parts of the provinces of Wilno and Nowogródek, which would fall to the Soviet Union, the Poles make up nearly half the population, 618,000 out of a total of 1,392,000. There are Polish majorities in some of the

easternmost

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easternmost districts bordering on the former Polish-Soviet frontier.

4. Central Sector

The line of the Bug River was the eastern boundary of "Congress Poland" and makes a fairly clear division between Polish-speaking and non-Polish-speaking populations, although there are some 63,000 Ukrainians in the districts bordering the western bank of the river, and some 102,000 Polish-speaking persons in the three districts of Brześć, Luboml and Włodzimierz, which border on the eastern bank. These three districts form the additional belt of territory left to Poland by Lines "F", "H", and "I"; all the other lines follow the course of the river. Their total population in 1931 was 452,000 of whom only 23 percent were Poles. There are no valid ethnic grounds for the inclusion of this area within Poland, except as compensation for the cession to the Soviet Union of predominantly Polish-speaking territory elsewhere.

In the remaining area of the provinces of Polesie and Wołyń, which falls to the Soviet Union under all alternative lines, there are only 408,000 Poles (14.7 percent) in a total population of 2,766,000.

5. Southern Sector

It is impossible to draw a line through Eastern Galicia which does not leave large number of Poles or Ukrainians under alien rule. Lines "A", "C" and "E" follow the line of the San River. This line is the least favorable to Poland; while the population to the west of it is almost purely Polish, nearly two million Poles, about two-fifths of the total population, inhabit the area east of the San River and would come under Soviet rule.

Line "E", which represents the continuation of the "Curzon" line in Eastern Galicia, runs somewhat to the north of line "A" in the Rawa Ruska region, and to the

east

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east of it in the Przemyśl region. It leaves to Poland a slightly greater area of mixed population, in which Poles and Ukrainians are fairly evenly balanced; this area includes the city of Przemyśl, which is strongly Polish.

Line "D" was suggested by the British Delegation at the Peace Conference of 1919 as a possible boundary between Poland and an autonomous state of Eastern Galicia. It follows roughly the eastern boundary of the province of Lwów. The total population of the Eastern Galician territory lying between Line "D" and Line "A" was 1,795,000 in 1931, of whom 831,000 (46 percent) were Poles, and 777,000 (43 percent) were Ukrainians. Line "D" leaves the strongly Polish city of Lwów to Poland.

Line "F" leaves to Poland a somewhat larger share of the territory of Eastern Galicia, including the western half of the province of Stanisławów. This added area, which has a population of almost half a million, is predominantly Ukrainian; the Polish element comprises less than one-fifth of the total. The principal arguments in favor of the assignment of this area to Poland are economic rather than ethnic.

Line "F" divides Eastern Galicia into two parts of nearly equal size. The western part, the area between Line "A" and Line "F", which would fall to Poland, had a total population, in 1931, of 2,301,000, of whom 927,000 (40 percent) were Polish and 1,155,000 (50 percent) were Ukrainian.

Line "J" runs through Eastern Galicia roughly along the western boundary of the province of Tarnopol, leaving that province to the Soviet Union, and leaving the provinces of Lwów and Stanisławów to Poland. This line is a poor boundary from the ethnic standpoint, since the province of Stanisławów, which would be left to Poland, has a three-to-one Ukrainian majority, whereas in the province of Tarnopol, which would be left to the Soviet Union, the

Poles

-14-

Poles have a slight numerical advantage over the Ukrainians.

Under Line "J", the larger part of Eastern Galicia would fall to Poland. Its total population, in 1931, was 3,324,000 of whom 1,826,000 (55 percent) were Ukrainians and 1,178,000 (35 percent) were Poles. The Soviet share of Eastern Galicia, which would include the province of Tarnopol and a part of the district of Sokal in the province of Lwów, had a population of 1,643,000, of whom 801,000 (48 percent) were Poles, and 758,000 (46 percent) were Ukrainians.

Lines "G", "H" and "I" leave the whole of Eastern Galicia to Poland. Poland would acquire a Ukrainian population of over two and one-half millions. The Polish element numbers just under two million. Thus Poland has no good ethnic claim to the whole of Eastern Galicia. However, since some of the easternmost districts, on the former Polish-Soviet frontier, have Polish majorities, it is impossible to draw a line of partition which would not leave a considerable number of Poles outside Poland. Similarly, any line drawn far enough to the east to include within Poland the Poles of the Lwów and Tarnopol regions must include also a large number of Ukrainians.

IV. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. Agriculture

Eastern Poland is essentially an agricultural region. In the four provinces of Wilno, Nowogródek, Polesie and Wolyń, 86 percent of the population is rural; in Eastern Galicia the proportion is 78 percent. Throughout Eastern Poland the main crops are rye and potatoes, both of which are produced in abundance in other parts of Poland.

The soil of the northern provinces is poor, production per hectare is low, and the rate of increase of the rural population is high. The region of the Pripet marshes, comprising the province of Polesia and the northern part of Wolyń, is largely useless swampland; its agriculture is at a primitive level, which the Polish state did almost nothing to raise. In the Wilno area some flax was grown for the Polish textile industries, but otherwise the agricultural products of the eastern provinces were

consumed

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consumed locally and contributed little to the economic life of other parts of Poland. From the agricultural standpoint, the region would probably be a liability either to Poland or to the Soviet Union, although there are possibilities for a greater development of fruit culture, industrial fibre plants, and cattle-raising.

Eastern Galicia has more fertile soil than the northern provinces; it produced, besides rye and potatoes, a large part of the wheat, maize, barley and hemp grown in pre-1939 Poland. It is very thickly settled and is faced with an acute problem of rural over-population. The economy of the Soviet Union could probably absorb the surplus population more easily than could the economy of Poland.

2. Forests

The area east of the Soviet-German line of 1939 (Line "A") has about 63 percent of the forest area of former Poland. All the eastern provinces, except Tarnopol, are more than 20 percent wooded. Polesie has the largest wooded area, 1,222,000 hectares, while the Carpathian region in the provinces of Lwów and Stanisławów is endowed with extensive pine and hardwood forests. Poland's forest wealth was rather recklessly exploited in the last twenty years but always remained an important item in the national economy.

About one-half of the Polish timber production^r was consumed locally as fuel, some went to Polish factories, and the remainder was exported. Timber alternated with coal as Poland's chief export product, averaging 17 percent of total exports in the period from 1924 to 1938. The loss of all the timber land in the eastern provinces would be felt severely by Poland. Any compromise line, however, which left at least the province of Białystok and a part of Eastern Galicia to Poland, would give to Poland a substantial share of the forest area.

3. Mineral Resources

Poland's principal oil-fields were situated in Eastern Galicia. The total crude oil output of these fields reached two million tons in 1909, but then gradually

declined

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declined to 507,000 tons in 1938, a consequence of the exhaustion of the existing wells. The fields of the Krosno-Jaslo region, west of Line "A", registered steady gains, but those of the Drohobycz-Boryslaw and Stanislawów regions, east of Line "A", produced less each year. However, the eastern region remained the principal producing area; in 1938 it accounted for two-thirds of Poland's total production.

The opinion is generally held by geologists and technicians that the decline in production will continue, and that the Galician oil industry will not be of any great importance in the future either to Poland or to the Soviet Union. However, both Polish and Soviet sources can be quoted in support of the thesis that an increase in production can be effected by extensive exploration and drilling, the use of new equipment, and the wider application of new techniques. The Soviet authorities drew up ambitious plans for the expansion of the industry in 1939, but the period of Soviet control was not long enough to test them.

Without the oil wells of the disputed Drohobycz and Stanislawów regions, Poland would have to import most of its oil. In the late 1930's Poland exported only a fraction of its petroleum products; almost all were consumed domestically. The oil wells of Eastern Galicia sent nearly 80 percent of their oil products to central and western Poland. Poland was free from dependence on foreign sources of oil, but economically it gained little by possessing its own oil-fields. Galician oil, crude or refined, was not able to compete on an equal basis, even in Poland, with American or Rumanian oil. Its value to Poland lay in its favorable influence on the country's foreign exchange position and its possible use in time of war or economic isolation. From that standpoint it would be more essential to Poland than to the oil-rich Soviet Union, although the latter country could make use of the Galician oil for mechanized farming operations in White Russia and Western Ukraine.

The other mineral resources of Eastern Poland are located almost entirely in Eastern Galicia. Natural gas, production of which has increased while that of petroleum has been falling, comes mainly from the

Drohobycz

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Drohobycz and Daszawa regions; it has been used for the manufacture of gasoline, for heat and light in nearby cities, and as an industrial fuel. The reserves are not great and are not expected to be of great economic importance in the future. Ozkerite is also produced in the Drohobycz region; this is the world's only significant commercial source of ozokerite.

Important deposits of potassium salts, valuable for agriculture and for the chemical industry, are located near Kalusz, in the province of Stanislawów. Smaller deposits are found near Stryj and near Drohobycz. The total production from all these sources was only 54,000 tons in 1923 but rose rapidly to 560,000 tons in 1938. The Carpathian region also contains large quantities of rock salt, which enabled Poland to meet all domestic demands and to have a surplus for export.

There are little-worked deposits of phosphates and gypsum in the provinces of Stanislawów and Tarnopol, in the valley of the Dniester River. Pyrites are mined near Rudki in the province of Lwów. There is some lignite in the province of Tarnopol. Altogether, the mineral resources of Eastern Galicia are varied, and they are of some economic importance to Poland; a more intense exploitation of them would probably be a definite part of any plan for the improvement of agriculture and for the development of industry in the central and eastern parts of Poland.

The other eastern provinces have practically no mineral wealth, except for the granite and basalt in the province of Wolyn, the kaolin on the border between Wolyn and Polesie, which supplied raw material for the whole Polish porcelain industry, and scattered deposits of lignite and peat over the whole area.

4. Industries

The principal manufacturing industries are 1) the textile industries of Bialystok, which produced between five and ten percent of all Polish textile goods; 2) various finishing industries in the two largest cities,

Wilno

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Wilno and Lwów; 3) the industries connected with the exploitation of the forest and mineral resources.

In 1938 there were twenty-three oil refineries in Eastern Poland, with only one cracking-plant. Almost all of them are located near the Drohobycz oil-fields or at Lwów. Saw-mills are located in the main forest areas, especially in the Carpathian region of Eastern Galicia. In the 1930's the saw-mills of the eastern provinces accounted for about one-half of Poland's production of lumber. Important cellulose, paper, and cardboard factories are located in the province of Wilno and in Eastern Galicia.

5. Economic Aspects of the Alternative Boundaries

Although no one economic factor, or combination of factors, seems to deserve decisive weight in the determination of a permanent boundary, the loss of the whole area east of Line "A" might be a serious blow to Poland's economy, since the Polish-Soviet frontier will probably be a real barrier to the exchange of goods. A compromise boundary which left at least some of the mineral resources of Eastern Galicia to Poland might soften the blow without greatly affecting the economic position of the Soviet Union, which has little need of the meager resources of Eastern Poland.

In the northern sector no economic factors are sufficiently important to affect boundary considerations, except perhaps the textile industries of Bialystok, which lie to the west of all the alternative lines save Line "A". When Bialystok was under Soviet occupation, in 1940, it was announced that it would be developed into one of the largest textile centers of the Soviet Union. Both Poland and the Soviet Union have other textile centers of much greater importance.

In Eastern Galicia, the San River line (Lines "A", "C" and "E") is the least favorable economically to Poland, depriving it of two-thirds of its oil and natural gas wells, most of its oil refineries, and all its deposits of ozokerite, potash, phosphates, and gypsum.

Line "B"

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Line "B" would also deprive Poland of all those economic resources. Line "D", on the other hand, leaves to Poland the Drohobycz-Boryslaw oil fields,, the natural gas wells in the same region, the ozokerite mines, and some of the larger Carpathian salt deposits. The phosphates, gypsum, granite, basalt, kaolin, and the major share of the potassium salts would be left within the Soviet Union. The city of Lwów, with its refineries and other industrial establishments, would fall to Poland.

Line "F" is somewhat more favorable to Poland than Line "D", since it runs to the east of the main potash deposits near Kalusz and Stryj; it also gives Poland a greater share of the petroleum and natural gas area and of the Carpathian forests. Poland would also regain the paper and cellulose factories located near Zydaczów.

Lines "G", "H" and "I" leave the whole of Eastern Galicia to Poland, giving that country the maximum opportunities for economic development and thus for absorbing the surplus rural population. Line "J" would have about the same consequences; it leaves only the province of Tarnopol, which has the fewest economic resources, to the Soviet Union. From an economic standpoint, Poland could afford to renounce its claim to all territory east of Line "J".

The territory which falls to the Soviet Union under all the alternative lines includes the greater part of the provinces of Wilno, Nowogródek, Polesie and Wolyń. It has considerable forest land, a low level of agricultural production, no important industries, and no minerals except stone, granite, basalt, kaolin, and some lignite and peat.

IV. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Railway and Canal Systems

The railways of Eastern Poland form a western extension of the Soviet railway system, most of the lines having been built by the Imperial Russian regime. Although

practically

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practically no new lines were constructed during the period of Polish administration, these railways are also closely linked to the network of Central Poland by the trunk lines to Warsaw, Lublin and Kraków.

The density of the railway network is 3.9 kilometers per hundred square kilometers, considerably less than in the other parts of pre-1939 Poland, although the density in relation to the population is about the same. The main east-west lines were little used in the 1919-1939 period because of the insignificant volume of Polish trade with the Soviet Union. The secondary lines are of some importance to the local economic life of the eastern provinces; their inadequacy and worn-out condition, however, have retarded the exploitation of the economic resources of the region.

The roads are also quite inadequate. The Polish government built some 200 miles of new highways in the eastern provinces, and the official statistics give the total length of the "public highways" as 19,000 kilometers; almost none of the roads have a paved surface or a stone substructure of any kind.

The rivers and canals, particularly in the region of the Pripet marshes, form the basis for an excellent waterway system, but they have suffered a marked decline in traffic, largely because they have been cut by political frontiers. The Dvina, Niemen, Pripet, Bug and Dniester Rivers are navigable by small boats and by timber rafts. Three important canals, the Augustów, the Oginski, and the Royal (Dnieper-Bug) Canals connect the Baltic with the Black Sea by joining the tributaries of the Dnieper with those of the Vistula and the Niemen. This system is capable of developing an expanded traffic.

2. Line "A"

Line "A" would give the Soviet Union two north-south railways connecting the main points on the east-west lines; one connects Wilno with Baranowicze, Luniniec, Sarny, Równe and Lwów; the other connects Wilno with Grodno, Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, Kowel and Lwów. From all important frontier cities on the Soviet side of the line there are railway communications to the other main points of the region by north-south lines as well as by those running to the east. The most direct lines from Brest-

Litovsk

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Litovsk to Lwów and Przemyśl are cut by Line "A", but the available alternative routes are not much longer.

On the Polish side of the line, railway communications are less adequate, since there would be no north-south trunk railway nearer to the frontier than the Warsaw-Lublin-Przemyśl line. The lines in the eastern part of the province of Lublin would be cut off from the important junctions of Brest-Litovsk and Rawa Ruska.

Soviet possession of Eastern Galicia would cut the direct railway connection between Poland and Rumania, the line running through Lwów and Stanisławów to Cernăuți, in Bukovina. This line, one of the main routes between Central Europe and the Black Sea, would be of great economic importance to an East European federation.

The Soviet Union might put to fuller use the canals which link the Pripet, Bug and Niemen river systems. The timber traffic which flourished on the Niemen before 1914 might be revived. 4/

3. Line "B"

Line "B" and Line "J" would deprive the Soviet railway system of the important junction of Białystok. Between Grodno and Brest-Litovsk there would be no direct connection within Soviet territory except the roundabout route via Baranowicze. A more direct connection could be provided by shifting the boundary a few kilometers to the west in the region north of Brest-Litovsk, so as to leave the whole length of the Brest-Hainowka-Wolkowysk railway on the Soviet side of the line.

Under line "B", Polish communications in Galicia would be improved by the inclusion within Poland of the railway junctions of Przemyśl and Chyrów, but would still be handicapped by the loss of Rawa Ruska, which provides the connection between the lines in Lwów province and those in the eastern part of Lublin. The Soviet Union would hold the most important communications center in

Eastern

4/ See T 221: "The Niemen River".

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Eastern Galicia, Lwów, whence railway lines run south to the oil-fields and to the Carpathian passes, southeast to Rumania, and east and northeast toward Kiev and Moscow.

Under Line "B" and Line "J", the Niemen River would form the Polish-Soviet frontier in the Grodno area and would not be likely to carry much traffic unless an international régime including all the riparian states were established.

4. Lines "C" and "E"

Lines "C" and "E" are identical with line "A" in the central and southern sectors. In the north, line "C" follows the eastern boundary of the province of Bialystok. The cities of Grodno, Wolkowysk and Bialystok would be tied into the Polish system of railway and canal communications. The Soviet Union would hold the frontier points of Wilno, Baranowicze and Brest-Litovsk, and the railways running eastward and southward from those points.

Line "E" leaves to Poland the Wilno region, which would be connected with the Polish railway network by lines running to Central Poland by way of Bialystok and by way of Lida and Wolkowysk. Both these lines would remain in Poland.

The Wilno area is an essential link in Poland's communications with Lithuania. If these two countries are expected to work in close economic coöperation, this area should be attached either to the one or the other. The principal lines of transportation between them are the Niemen River and the three railway lines which connect central Lithuania with the main Warsaw-Leningrad railway, which they join in the Wilno region.

5. Line "D"

Line "D" is identical with Line "C" in the northern and central sectors. In the south it leaves a larger share of Eastern Galicia, including the city of Lwów, to Poland. Lwów is the junction of the trunk lines from

Warsaw

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Warsaw and from Kraków, and of the secondary lines from the oil-fields region and other points to the south and west. The principal line from the Drohobycz-Boryslaw oil region, however, runs by way of Stryj, which would lie on the Soviet side of the boundary.

Inclusion of Lwów in Poland would deprive the Soviet railways in the provinces of Tarnopol and Stanisławów of their key junction.

Poland would have direct contact by rail with Ruthenia by way of the Lwów-Užhorod line. The other two lines connecting Eastern Galicia with Ruthenia would be in Soviet hands. Soviet territory would form a wedge separating Poland from Rumania and cutting the main Lwów-Cernăuți railway.

6. Line "F"

Line "F" leaves to Poland the Wilno area and good river and rail communications with Lithuania. In the central sector, it leaves to Poland the cities of Brest-Litovsk, Włodzimierz and Sokal, which are located east of the Bug River. Although the main railway connecting these three points runs through Kowel, which would be in Soviet territory, their possession by Poland would greatly improve the Polish railway network.

The railway between Lwów and the Drohobycz oil-fields, by way of Stryj, would run entirely within Polish territory. Poland would have an additional direct rail link with Ruthenia, the Lwów-Mukačevo line. The Soviet Union would have access to only one line to Ruthenia, the line which runs through the Jablonica Pass. Since the Soviet Union would hold the eastern part of the province of Stanisławów all the way to the Carpathians, the Lwów-Cernăuți railway would still run across Soviet territory.

7. Lines "G", "H", and "I"

In the northern sector, Lines "G" and "H" follow the eastern boundary of the province of Białystok, leaving to Poland the railway junctions of Białystok and Wolkowysk, and waterway communication with Lithuania and the Baltic Sea by way of the Augustów Canal and the Niemen River. Line "I" leaves to Poland, in addition, the city of Wilno and three railway connections with Lithuania.

In the

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In the central sector, Line "G" follows the Bug, while Lines "H" and "I" run further to the east, leaving to Poland the cities of Brest-Litovsk, Włodzimierz and Sokal, thus facilitating Polish communications. Communication between Poland's share of Eastern Galicia and the Bialystok region would be difficult without use of railway lines crossing Soviet territory. The main route by the Polish railways, via Lublin and Warsaw, would involve a wide détour to the west. However, if there were a real economic demand for a Bialystok-Lwów railway, there would be no important physical obstacles to its construction.

These three lines leave the whole of Eastern Galicia to Poland. Poland would have three direct lines of rail communication with Ruthenia and two with Bukovina.

8. Line "J"

Line "J" is identical with Line "B" in the northern and central sectors, where, from the standpoint of communications, it is more favorable to the Soviet Union than to Poland, particularly if a slight rectification should be made, so as to leave the Brest-Hainowka-Wolkowysk railway in Soviet hands. In the south it cuts across Eastern Galicia, leaving the province of Tarnopol to the Soviet Union; it terminates at the border of Bukovina near Zaleszczyki. The whole length of the Lwów-Cernăuți railway as far as the border of Bukovina, and the lines branching off from it and running to the Carpathian passes, would be in Polish hands. The loss of the province of Tarnopol would not adversely affect Polish communications in the rest of Eastern Galicia.

PS:JCCampbell:mhp

TABLE I

A. Ethnic groups on the Polish side of the alternative lines

	Total	Polish	Ukrainian	White Russian
Line "A"	-	-	-	-
Line "B"	1,401,573	992,010	150,754	76,205
percent		70.1	9.3	5.4
Line "C"	1,455,849	1,023,559	3,323	205,551
percent		69.8	0.2	14
Line "D"	3,251,210	1,834,476	779,123	205,690
percent		56.6	23.9	6.3
Line "E"	2,212,036	1,592,668	3,971	259,511
percent		71.2	0.2	11.7
Line "F"	3,000,196	2,639,439	1,351,454	276,873
percent		52.8	26.5	5.5
		"Local" - 95,226 (1.9%)		
Line "G"	6,425,759	3,007,590	2,572,166	205,771
percent		46.8	40	3.2
Line "H"	6,877,867	3,110,274	2,744,172	222,984
percent		45.2	39.9	3.2
		"Local" - 95,226 (1.4%)		
Line "I"	7,623,814	3,679,263	2,744,690	276,934
percent		48.3	36	3.6
		"Local" - 95,226 (1.3%)		
Line "J"	4,419,767	2,026,197	1,524,324	76,338
percent		45.8	41.3	1.7

TABLE I (continued)

	Russian	Lithuanian	Jewish
Line "A"	-	-	-
Line "B"	25,154	6,815	156,437
percent	1.8	0.5	11.2
Line "C"	35,106	13,256	177,340
percent	2.4	0.9	12.1
Line "D"	35,752	13,256	347,361
percent	1.1	0.4	10.7
Line "E"	49,493	77,150	219,484
percent	2.2	3.5	9.9
Line "F"	54,892	77,160	485,656
percent	1.1	1.5	9.7
Line "G"	36,159	13,271	541,298
percent	0.6	0.2	8.4
Line "H"	40,753	13,279	597,441
percent	0.6	0.2	8.7
Line "I"	55,240	77,173	639,585
percent	0.7	1	8.4
Line "J"	25,979	6,828	410,332
percent	0.6	-	9.3

B. Ethnic groups on the Soviet side of the alternative lines

Lines	Total	Polish	Ukrainian	White Russian
"A"	11,976,356	4,833,918	4,035,862	986,667
percent		40.4	33.9	8.2
"B"	10,574,788	3,841,908	3,935,108	910,462
percent		36.3	37.1	8.6
"C"	10,510,509	3,610,259	4,052,839	761,106
percent		34.3	38.6	7.4
"D"	8,725,148	2,979,442	3,276,739	760,977
percent		34.2	37.6	9
"E"	9,764,262	3,241,280	4,051,891	727,156
percent		33.2	41.6	7.4
"F"	6,976,162	2,194,479	2,734,408	699,794
percent		31.4	39.3	10
"G"	6,550,699	1,826,328	1,483,696	780,896
percent		28.9	25.7	14.1
"H"	5,098,791	1,723,644	1,311,690	763,663
percent		33.8	25.7	15
"I"	4,352,644	1,154,633	1,311,272	709,733
percent		26.5	30.1	16.3
"J"	7,355,591	2,806,721	2,251,538	910,309
percent		37.2	29.6	12

B. Ethnic groups on the Soviet side of the alternative lines
(continued)

Lines	Russian	Lithuanian	Jewish	"Local"
"A"	125,891	82,732	1,045,652	707,088
percent	1.1	0.7	8.7	5.9
"B"	100,757	75,917	859,225	707,038
percent	1	0.7	8.4	5.7
"C"	90,753	69,475	859,522	707,088
percent	0.9	0.7	8.5	5.7
"D"	90,139	69,475	859,301	707,088
percent	1	0.6	8	5.1
"E"	76,328	5,582	825,178	707,088
percent	0.8	-	6.5	7.2
"F"	70,959	5,572	580,036	611,852
percent	1	-	5	5.3
"G"	89,732	69,461	854,354	707,088
percent	1.6	1.3	9.1	13.7
"H"	85,132	69,453	445,251	611,852
percent	1.7	1.4	2.6	12
"I"	70,551	5,559	405,077	611,852
percent	1.6	2	9.5	14.1
"J"	99,912	75,904	535,330	707,088
percent	1.5	1	8.4	5.4

Source: Polish Census of 1931.

TABLE II

Ethnic groups on each side of the alternative lines

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Polen</u>	<u>Ukrainians, White Russians, Russians, and "Local"</u>
Line "A"			
1. Polish side	-	-	-
2. Soviet side	11,976,358	4,833,918 (40.4%)	6,875,508 (49.1%)
Line "B"			
1. Polish side	1,401,573	992,010 (70.1%)	232,113 (16.6%)
2. Soviet side	10,574,785	3,841,908 (36.3%)	5,643,398 (53.4%)
Line "C"			
1. Polish side	1,465,849	1,023,659 (69.8%)	243,990 (16.6%)
2. Soviet side	10,810,509	3,810,259 (35.3%)	5,631,518 (51.8%)
Line "D"			
1. Polish side	3,251,310	1,604,478 (49.5%)	1,020,565 (31.4%)
2. Soviet side	8,725,148	2,979,442 (34.2%)	4,654,943 (53.6%)
Line "E"			
1. Polish side	2,212,096	1,592,669 (71.2%)	312,975 (14.1%)
2. Soviet side	9,764,262	3,241,250 (33.2%)	5,562,533 (57%)
Line "F"			
1. Polish side	5,000,185	2,639,439 (52.8%)	1,739,445 (34.8%)
2. Soviet side	6,976,162	2,194,479 (31.4%)	4,117,063 (59%)
Line "G"			
1. Polish side	6,425,759	3,007,590 (46.8%)	2,814,098 (43.6%)
2. Soviet side	5,560,599	1,826,328 (32.9%)	3,081,412 (55.2%)
Line "H"			
1. Polish side	6,877,567	3,110,274 (45.2%)	3,103,135 (45.1%)
2. Soviet side	5,098,791	1,723,844 (33.6%)	2,772,373 (54.4%)
Line "I"			
1. Polish side	7,623,814	3,679,283 (48.3%)	3,171,990 (41.6%)
2. Soviet side	4,382,544	1,154,635 (26.5%)	2,703,618 (62.1%)
Line "J"			
1. Polish side	4,419,767	2,026,197 (45.8%)	1,926,681 (43.6%)
2. Soviet side	7,556,591	2,808,721 (37.2%)	3,948,847 (52.3%)

Source: Polish Census of 1931.